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PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT, ITS NURTURING AND
INJURIOUS EFFECTS TO COMPETITION, AND
THE TENSION BETWEEN JURISPRUDENTIAL
ECONOMICS AND MICROECONOMICS
Kevin S. Marshall*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article addresses market conduct involving the
disparagement of a rival or its product. Such conduct may
have one of two polar-opposite effects on the competitive
marketplace. To the extent that the disparagement is
truthful and informative, it nurtures and fosters an
environment within which competition may thrive. To the
extent such disparagement is intentionally false and
deceptive, it desecrates the hallowed efficiencies for which
competition is so highly touted.
The purpose of this article is to illustrate and discuss
these polar-opposite effects from a purely microeconomic
perspective.1 To meet these ends, this article first cites and
* Kevin S. Marshall is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of
La Verne's College of Law, Ontario, California. Dr. Marshall received a B.A. in
economics from Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois in 1982, a Juris Doctorate
from Emory University School of Law in 1985, a Masters in Public Affairs from
the University of Texas at Dallas in 1991, and a Ph.D. in political economy from
the University of Texas at Dallas in 1993. Professor Marshall teaches courses
in antitrust, law and economics, remedies, and contracts.
1. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 3-4 (5th
ed. 2001) ("Microeconomics deals with the behavior of individual economic units.
... More precisely, it is about the allocation of scarce resources. For example,
microeconomics explains how consumers can best allocate their limited incomes
to the various goods and services available to purchase. It explains how
workers can best allocate their time to labor instead of leisure, or to one job
instead of another. And it explains how firms can best allocate limited financial
resources to hiring additional workers versus buying new machinery, and to
producing one set of products versus another.").
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explains the United States Supreme Court's definition of
"antitrust injury."' Next, this article explains and applies
microeconomics to anticompetitive conduct.' Then, the article
illustrates the clash between anticompetitive conduct, as
defined within a microeconomic framework, and
anticompetitive conduct defined by jurisprudential
economics.4  This article also explains the term
jurisprudential economics, which refers to the judicial
application of economic theory within an analytical
framework driven by stare decisis, as exemplified by Judge
Easterbrook's recent opinion in Sanderson v. Culligan
International Co.,' in which he postulates that product
disparagement "is not actionable under the antitrust laws."6
Finally, this article concludes that the intentionally false
disparagement of a rival's goods or services is injurious to
competition and constitutes unlawful activity under either § 1
(when in combination with others) or § 2, or both, of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.7
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2005).
6. Id. at 624.
7. See infra Part V. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
Id. § 2.
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II. ANTITRUST INJURY
Antitrust injury is an "injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes [the] defendants' acts unlawful."'  It is regarded as
synonymous with "injury to competition"9 and is frequently
understood to result in curtailed output and higher prices. 10
To understand "injury to competition," it is necessary to
understand the fundamental underpinnings of
microeconomics' theoretical model of competition. Although
the term "antitrust injury" may be characterized as an action
that results in curtailed output and higher prices, the
following analysis demonstrates that the term is much richer.
It illustrates that whenever market conduct impairs one or
more of the requisite antecedent conditions of the perfectly
competitive economic model, competition is thereby injured.
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,12 the
United States Supreme Court "christened"'3 the following
8. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
9. Healow v. Anesthesia Partners, No. 95-35241, 1996 WL 442524, at *5
(9th Cir. Aug. 5, 1996) (unpublished) (holding that an anesthesiologist had no
antitrust injury because the underlying market structure did not support any
inference of injury to competition).
10. Culligan, 415 F.3d at 623; see also NCAA v. Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
103-07 (1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1984); William
H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization,
Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221, 1268-73 &
n.253 (1989).
11. See infra Parts III.A, D.
12. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
13. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ANTITRUST LAW § 3.03, at 81 (2002) ("Although the Brunswick christened this
requirement 'antitrust injury,' the concept is older. It is reflected in criticism of
the lower court decision in Brunswick itself, as well as in some applications of
the 'target area' test for standing." (footnote omitted)). See also id. § 3.03, at 81
n.15 ("While the antitrust injury test is not the same as the older 'target area'
test, it developed largely through earlier target area cases. In those cases,
plaintiffs were ruled ineligible for § 4 damages despite injury caused by the
defendant's action, on the ground that they were outside the 'target area' meant
to be protected by the antitrust laws. For example, in Reilbert [sic] v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973),
employees of a merged firm were denied damages when they were fired
following reorganization resulting from an allegedly illegal merger. Despite the
fact that the firings would not have occurred without the merger, the court held
that the employee's interest was not one 'which the prohibition of [certain
mergers] was clearly intended to protect. . . . If there has been a wrong,
appellant cannot show that it results from the lessening of competition.
Termination of employment will often occur whether a merger is legal or illegal.'
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prima facie element of any antitrust damages claim:
"Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The
injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the
violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation."1 4 The Supreme Court clarified that an antitrust
plaintiff not only has the burden of establishing an injury-in-
fact, but also of proving an antitrust injury-an injury to
competition. 15
Approximately nine years after Brunswick, in Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,16 the Supreme Court
reiterated that a private plaintiff seeking antitrust relief
must show a threat of antitrust injury. Supplementing its
holding in Brunswick, the Cargill Court provided that "a
showing of loss or damage due merely to increased
competition does not constitute such injury." 7 By citing and
restating its reasoning in Brunswick, the Court made clear
that antitrust injury was now a permanent fixture upon the
antitrust jurisprudential landscape: 8
Brunswick holds that the antitrust laws do not require the
courts to protect small businesses from the loss of profits
due to continued competition, but only against the loss of
profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws. The
Id. at 731. Accord Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 507 F.2d 959, 962
(8th Cir. 1974) ('[Any acquisition is likely to create some injury. But it is only
anti-competitive injury which § 7 was intended to eliminate ... .'); Billy Baxter
v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923
(1971)").
14. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added).
15. Id.; see also 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 3.03, at 77.
16. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
17. Id. at 122.
18. Subsequent to the Court's decision in Brunswick and prior to its decision
in Cargill, the Supreme Court confirmed the importance of showing antitrust
injury under § 4 of the Clayton Act. In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457
U.S. 465 (1982), the Court found that "a health-plan subscriber suffered
antitrust injury as a result of the plan's 'purposefully anticompetitive scheme' to
reduce competition for psychotherapeutic services by reimbursing subscribers
for services provided by psychiatrists but not for services provided by
psychologists." Id. at 483. The Court further noted that antitrust injury "as
analyzed in Brunswick, is one factor to be considered in determining the
redressability of a particular form of injury under § 4." Id. at 483 n.19.
Similarly, in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), the Court applied the
Brunswick test. Id. at 539-40.
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kind of competition that Monfort alleges here, competition
for increased market share, is not activity forbidden by the
antitrust laws. It is simply, as petitioners claim, vigorous
competition. To hold that the antitrust laws protect
competitors from the loss of profits due to such price
competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by
a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share. The
antitrust laws require no such perverse result, for "it is in
the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to
engage in vigorous competition, including price
competition." The logic of Brunswick compels the
conclusion that the threat of loss of profits due to possible
price competition following a merger does not constitute a
threat of antitrust injury.19
Brunswick and Cargill clearly established that an
antitrust injury is a required element of proof in most, if not
all, private federal antitrust lawsuits. 20  Both define an
antitrust injury as an injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent.21 Thus, since the Supreme Court
had previously held that "the antitrust laws . . . were enacted
for the protection of competition,"22 it logically follows that the
"injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect 2 3 resulting
from a violation of the antitrust laws.
III. MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONDUCT INJURIOUS TO
COMPETITION
A. The Perfectly Competitive Model-A Paradigm for
Identifying Conduct Injurious to Competition
Instruction on the requisite antecedent conditions24
underlying the perfectly competitive model not only
dramatically simplifies the task of understanding antitrust
precedent, but also provides an analytical framework for
identifying anticompetitive conduct independent of
precedential constraint. Once the requisite antecedent
conditions for competition to thrive are identified and
19. Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 116-17 (citation omitted).
20. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, §3.03, at 77-87.
21. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
22. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
23. Id. at 489.
24. The requisite antecedent conditions may also be referred to as
fundamental assumptions or underlying assumptions.
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understood, the jurist, the antitrust practitioner, and the
economic analyst are in a superior position from which to
analyze anticompetitive conduct that may trigger statutory
liability.
The requisite antecedent conditions of the perfectly
competitive model25 consist essentially of the following:
1. The existence of numerous buyers and sellers,26
each acting independently27 and rationally;28
2. Each buyer and seller consumes or produces such
a negligible amount of the total output that no one
buyer or seller can influence price by the amount
they either consume or produce;29
3. There are no barriers to entry or exit with respect
to consumer or producer markets;30
25. See DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 242 (5th ed. 2004) (outlining
the "necessary conditions for perfect competition" to thrive).
26. See EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS 356-57 (11th
ed. 2004) ("The firm in a perfectly competitive market has so many rivals that
competition becomes impersonal in the extreme .... A competitive firm faces so
little of the market demand curve that its effective demand curve is horizontal
at whatever price the market will bear. A competitive firm can only decide the
output that it would like to supply to the market at a given price."); PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 328 ("In a perfectly competitive market, the large
number of sellers and buyers of a good ensures that no single seller or buyer can
affect its price. The market forces of supply and demand determine price.").
27. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 26, at 426, 433-34 ("Unlike the case
of monopolistic competition, the supply side of an oligopoly market is composed
of a few firms. . . . Conditions in oligopolistic industries tend to promote
collusion, since the number of firms is small and the firms recognize their
interdependence. The advantages to the firms of collusion seem obvious;
increased profits, decreased uncertainty, and a better opportunity to prevent
other's entry."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 430 ("In [competitive]
markets, each firm could take price or market demand as given and largely
ignore its competitors. In an oligopolistic market, however, a firm sets price or
output based partly on strategic considerations regarding the behavior price or
output based on strategic considerations regarding the behavior of its
competitors.").
28. STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 634 (6th ed.
2005) ("[T]he economist assumes that people are rational."); see also infra note
40 (discussing rational choice as an equimarginal principle).
29. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 26, at 290 ("[Plerfect competition
requires that each participant in the market, whether a buyer or a seller, be so
small in relation to the entire market that he or she cannot affect the product's
price."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 252 ('Because each individual
firm sells a sufficiently small proportion of total market output, its decisions
have no impact on market price.... The assumption of price taking applies to
consumers as well as firms.").
30. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 26, at 290 ('Perfect competition also
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4. All market participants (i.e., all buyers and
sellers) are fully informed of all relevant economic
and technological data;31
5. All products are homogeneous, or rather,
constitute interchangeable substitutes for each
other; 32 and
6. The forces of supply and demand are free to
determine the quantity of output in a relevant
market, as well as to determine a market-clearing,
competitive price with respect to the same.33
Microeconomic theory teaches that if these conditions are
met, the perfectly competitive model will create efficiencies in
requires that all resources be completely mobile. Each resource must, in other
words, be able to enter or leave the market with ease and to switch from one use
to another without fuss or bother."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at
253 ("[F]ree entry (exit), means that there are no special costs that make it
difficult for a new firm either to enter an industry and produce or to exit if it
cannot make a profit. As a result, buyers can easily switch from one supplier to
another, and suppliers can easily enter or exit a market.").
31. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 26, at 290-91 ("[Plerfect competition
requires that consumers, firms, and resource owners have perfect knowledge of
the relevant economic and technological data. Consumers must be aware of all
prices. Laborers and owners of capital must be aware of how much their
resources will bring in all possible uses. Firms must know the prices of all
inputs and the characteristics of all relevant technologies. And in its purest
sense, perfect competition requires that all of these economic decision-making
units have an accurate knowledge of the past, the present, and the future.");
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 595 ("[We have assumed that
consumers and producers have complete information about the economic
variables that are relevant for the choices they face.").
32. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 26, at 405 (noting that in perfectly
competitive situations the goods sold are "completely homogeneous from one
seller to another"); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 252-53 ("Price-
taking behavior typically occurs in markets where firms produce identical, or
nearly identical, products. When the products of all of the firms in a market are
perfectly substitutable with one another-that is, when they are homogeneous-
no firm can raise the price of its product above the price of other firms without
losing most or all of its business.").
33. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 26, at 347-48 ("We have seen that a
perfectly competitive economy maximizes the total net gain of consumers and
producers. We then showed.., how deadweight losses-reductions in economic
efficiency-result if the government [obstructs the forces of supply and demand
by imposing] a price ceiling[,] ... a price floor[j . .. a tariff, a quota, or an excise
tax."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 55 n.2 ("The market mechanism
is the tendency for supply and demand to equilibrate (i.e., for price to move to
the market-clearing level), so that there is neither excess demand nor excess
supply.").
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consumption, production, and allocation.34 Further, it is
through the creation of such efficiencies that a perfectly
competitive market promises the greatest social opportunity
for wealth creation. 5 In antitrust parlance, it promises
greater output at lower prices.
If the above conditions must be met for the perfectly
competitive market to thrive, then, from a purely economic
perspective, it follows that any market conduct or activity
that impairs, threatens, suppresses, or jeopardizes any one or
more of such underlying conditions must be discouraged as a
matter of public policy. It is in this context that the
underlying conditions provide a powerful analytical paradigm
for identifying market conduct or activity that may likely
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, an unfair
method of competition, and a competitive injury.
B. Perfect Competition and Its Assumption of Rationality
Economic theory has long acknowledged that the given
environment within which society functions is constrained by
scarcity and that such scarcity is the fundamental source of
social and political conflict.3 Given such scarcity, all societies
are confronted with the problem of determining (1) what, and
how much, to produce, (2) how to produce, and (3) for whom to
produce.37 The field of microeconomics has demonstrated that
the adoption of the perfectly competitive model provides a
remarkable social mechanism with which to address the
social problems generated by scarcity.3" The perfectly
competitive model ultimately nurtures, if not ensures,
efficiencies in the allocation, production, and distribution of
scarce resources.3 9 Central to the perfectly competitive model
is the assumption that all market participants are rational,
with rational action being defined by the principle of utility-
profit maximization.40 Any act of consumption or production
34. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 575-85, 590-91.
35. See id.
36. See COLANDER, supra note 25, at 5, 9.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 9.
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. See COLANDER, supra note 25, at 6-8, 239 (noting that "firms are profit-
maximizing entrepreneurial firms"); id. at 181 ("The analysis of rational choice
is the analysis of how individuals choose goods within their budget in order to
maximize total utility, and how maximizing total utility can be accomplished by
238 [Vol: 46
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that fails to maximize the utility or profit of an individual or
firm is considered to be irrational economic behavior.
Economic rationality necessarily requires that all costs and
benefits be considered when exercising economic choices.
Consequently, in order to act rationally, all market
participants must be fully informed of all costs and benefits
associated with their respective economic activities.4 Once
informed of all activity costs and benefits, an economically
rational actor will weigh his or her costs and benefits, and if
the benefits exceed or equal the costs, he or she will engage in
such activity.42 To the extent that all such costs and benefits
are not considered (i.e., they are external to the rational
decision-making process), non-utility/profit-maximizing
choices will be made, resulting in unacceptable market
inefficiencies."
considering marginal utility. The analysis begins with the premise that
rational individuals want as much satisfaction as they can get from their
available resources. The term rational in economics means, specifically, that
people prefer more to less and will make choices that give them as much
satisfaction as possible."); LANDSBURG, supra note 28, at 634 ("The economist
assumes that people act according to the principle of equimarginality. This is
often expressed by saying that the economist assumes that people are rational.
Indeed, it has been said that a student becomes a true economist on the day
when he fully understands and accepts the principle that people equate costs
and benefits at the margin."); EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 55 (6th ed. 1988) ("Given the consumer's tastes, we assume
that he or she is rational, in the sense that he or she tries to maximize utility.");
STEPHEN A. MATHIS & JANET KOscIANSKI, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: AN
INTEGRATED APPROACH 2 (2002) ("[M]aking rational choices is a matter of
choosing the amount(s) of some decision, or independent, variable(s) such that
the extra benefit received from the last unit chosen is just equal to its extra
cost. In economics, the process of measuring and comparing the extra benefits
and extra costs associated with a rational decision is known as marginal
analysis."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 254 ("The assumption of
profit maximization is frequently used in microeconomics because it predicts
business behavior reasonably accurately and avoid unnecessary analytical
complications.").
41. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 26, at 290-91 ("[Plerfect competition
requires that consumers, firms, and resource owners have perfect knowledge of
the relevant economic and technological data.... Firms must know the prices of
all inputs and the characteristics of all relevant technologies. And in its purest
sense, perfect competition requires that all of these economic decision-making
units have an accurate knowledge of the past, the present, and the future.").
42. See ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CONCEPTS
AND PRACTICE 31 (3d ed. 2006) ("Choose the combination of [goods and/or
inputs] that maximizes net benefits.").
43. MANSFIELD, supra note 40, at 675 ("[Plroducers act in ways that cause
harm to others without paying the full cost of the damage. In these and other,
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C. Perfect Competition and Its Information Requirements
In short, rationality requires that market participants be
fully informed of all relevant economic and technological
data.44  In fact, as noted above, fully informed market
participants are an essential operational condition of the
perfectly competitive model. Without full information,
distortions in output and price will result.
D. Product Disparagement and Its Nurturing and Injurious
Effects
1. Effect on Access to Information
Product disparagement, if truthful and accurate, is
welcome information in the competitive marketplace. To the
extent that a disparagement practice might inform a
consumer of the differences between two competing products,
such a practice nurtures a vigorous competitive environment.
As long as the disparagement practice contributes to the
information available to market participants, it lubricates the
operational efficiencies of the perfectly competitive model.
The more information available to market participants, the
more rational their choices; the more rational their choices,
the more efficient the model is in determining a welfare-
maximizing equilibrium.
Conversely, product disparagement that is false and
inaccurate is an iniquity that strikes at the very heart of a
competitive marketplace and cannot be tolerated. False
information impairs rational action on both the demand side
and the supply side of the market. For example, conduct
falsely disparaging a rival or a rival's goods or services
interferes with the consumer's ability to identify all benefits
and/or costs associated with the purchase of the rival's goods
or services. Most importantly, it distorts the environment
within which market participants are expected to effectuate
rational choice. In addition, the distorting effect of false and
similar cases, the pursuit of private gain will not necessarily promote the social
welfare.").
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 1, at 595 ("[W~e have assumed that consumers and producers have
complete information about the economic variables that are relevant for the
choices they face.").
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inaccurate information often results in the underproduction
of the disparaged product or service and/or the
overproduction of the disparager's product or service. In
short, the intentional false disparagement of rival goods and
services creates disequilibrium with respect to output and
price.
As one economist observed:
Real-world markets often involve deception, cheating, and
inaccurate information. For example, car dealers know
about defects in the cars they sell but do not always reveal
those defects to consumers. Another example is when
consumers who want health insurance do not reveal their
health problems to the insurance company. In both cases,
it is in the interest of the knowledgeable person not to
reveal information that the other person or firm would
need to know to make an informed decision about the
transaction. Hence imperfect information can be a cause
of market failure.
45
Figure 1 illustrates the distortions that might result from
deceptive and false disparagement practices. 46  The demand
function for Firm A's product is a statement of the relation
between the quantity demanded, Q, and all factors that affect
that quantity. These factors include the price of the good or
service under analysis, the price of other goods,47 the number
of buyers in the market, the relative income of consumers,
consumer tastes and preferences, general marketplace
expectations, and other possible influences.48 To the extent
the disparagement distorts the price49 of the product or
negatively influences the taste and preferences of the
consumer with respect to Firm A's product, the demand for
45. COLANDER, supra note 25, at 417; see also PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 1, at 596-97 ("Market failure can also occur when consumers lack
information about the quality or nature of a product and so cannot make utility-
maximizing purchasing decisions.").
46. See infra fig. 1.
47. Other goods include, namely, compliments and substitutes.
48. MARK HIRSCHEY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMicS 67-68 (10th ed. 2003) ("In
functional form, a demand function may be expressed as Quantity of Product X
Demanded = Q. = f (Price of X, Prices of Related Goods, Expectations of Price
Changes, Consumer Incomes, Tastes and Preferences, Advertising
Expenditures, and so on).").
49. Price distortions will necessarily result from the consumer's under-
evaluation of the benefits provided by the product, or from the over-evaluation
of the costs associated with the product.
2006] 241
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the product or service may likely shift to the left, from d to d',
curtailing output of Firm A's product or service from Q* to
Q,.50
Figure 1:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FALSE DISPARAGEMENT
FiRM A
d
d
P -- -- P*- - -
d "
Q* Q- Q"
Without Disparagement With Disparagement
Additionally, the disparagement practice may not only
distort the market for the disparaged product, but it may also
distort the market for product substitutes. For example, in
Figure 2 below, Firm B, by and through its disparaging
practices, may capture market share from Firm A, resulting
in an increase in Firm B's output from Q* to Q' as consumers
substitute Firm B's products or services for Firm A's.
50. In this illustration and those that follow in this subsection, the
disparagement conduct is exhibited in a highly competitive monopolistic market
characterized and driven by product differentiation. See PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 424 ("A monopolistically competitive market has
two key characteristics: 1. Firms compete by selling differentiated products that
are highly substitutable for one another but not perfect substitutes.... 2. There
is free entry and exit: it is relatively easy for new firms to enter the market with
their own brands and for existing firms to leave if their products become
unprofitable.").
242 [Vol: 46
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Figure 2:
COMPETITIVE EFFEcTs OF FALSE DISPARAGEMENT
SS
P t
d
*
Q - O°  Q" -> Q
Firm A Firm B
Successful disparagement also results in a type of market
failure commonly referred to in economics as adverse
selection." Adverse selection occurs "when buyers and sellers
have different amounts of information about the good for
sale,"5 2 or "when products of different qualities are sold at a
single price because buyers or sellers are not sufficiently
informed to determine the true quality at the time of
purchase." 3  False disparagement practices restrain the
rational action necessary for efficient exchange and,
therefore, restrain trade. False disparagement vitiates the
conditional environment within which competition thrives.
Consequently, to the extent the false disparagement of a
rival's products creates information asymmetries, it injures
competition.
It merits noting that such practices have been held to
constitute an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.M In Carter Products, Inc.
51. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 598; see also COLANDER, supra
note 25, at 417 ("Such a market failure is called an adverse selection problem-
a problem that occurs when buyers and sellers have different amounts of
information about the good for sale."); LANDSBURG, supra note 28, at 313-15
("Adverse selection: The problem that arises when people know more about
their own risk characteristics than others do.").
52. COLANDER, supra note 25, at 417.
53. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 598.
54. Section 5(a)(1), the pertinent provision of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, states: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are herby declared
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v. FTC,55 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
Commission's finding that the manufacturer of a popular
aerosol shaving cream had engaged in unfair methods of
competition when it disseminated information that was
misleading, unfair, and damaging to a competing product.
5 6
The court reasoned that
under Section 5(a) [of the Federal Trade Commission Act]
the law is clear that an advertisement is illegal if it
contains a false claim inducing the purchase of a product
inferior to the product the consumer bargained for. The
false claim may be a quality, an ingredient, or
effectiveness the advertised product does not have. Or the
advertisement may disparage competing products by
attributing to them inferiorities they do not possess.57
2. Effect on Other Conditions
A successful campaign of disparagement may also
jeopardize and threaten other conditions necessary for
competition to thrive. It can create entry barriers, lead to
capricious market exit, create artificial market equilibrium,
or even lead to oligopolies and monopolies. A firm injures
competition if it falsely disparages its competitors and their
respective products for the purpose of forcing them to exit the
market, or to create a barrier to their entry or re-entry into
the market. Such practices will certainly drive up prices by
unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
55. Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963).
56. Id. at 530-31.
57. Id. at 528 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Accord Perma-Maid Co.
v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282, 284-85 (6th Cir. 1941) (wherein manufacturers of steel
cookware were enjoined from making "representations that food prepared or
kept in aluminum utensils was detrimental to health and caused formation of
poisons and that the consumption of such food would cause ulcers, cancers,
cancerous growths and other ailments, afflictions and diseases"). But see FED.
TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING
(Aug. 13, 1979), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-compare.html
(last visited March 7, 2006) ("Comparative advertising, when truthful and non-
deceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and assists them
in making rational purchase decisions. Comparative advertising encourages
product improvement and innovation, and can lead to lower prices in the
marketplace .... [However, slome industry codes which prohibit practices such
as 'disparagement,' 'disparagement of competitors,' 'improper disparagement,'
'unfairly attacking,' 'discrediting,' may operate as a restriction on comparative
advertising. The Commission has previously held that disparaging advertising
is permitted so long as it is truthful and not deceptive.").
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curtailing output, as demonstrated in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3:
WELFARE EFFECTS OF SUCCESSFUL
DISPARAGEMENT CAMPAIGN S
S
..... Deadweight
I I D
Q, <- Q
The market supply function, S, for a given product is a
statement of the relation between the quantity supplied and
all factors affecting that quantity. Such factors include the
price of the good in question, the price of a supplier's related
goods, the number of sellers producing the good, input prices,
the current state of technology, and general market
expectations.58 As rival firms are driven from the market as a
result of false disparagement, the market supply curve, S,
shifts to S', thereby resulting in a curtailment of output (Q*
decreases to Q') and an increase in price (P* increases to P).
As a result, there is a deadweight loss5 9 to society.
IV. MICROECONOMICS VS. JURISPRUDENTIAL ECONOMICS
A. Antitrust Analysis and the Tension Between
Microeconomics and Jurisprudential Economics
The artful application of antitrust law generally depends
on the jurist's ability to synthesize an historical morass of
58. HIRSCHEY, supra note 48, at 74 ("In functional form, a supply function
can be expressed as Quantity of Product X Supplied = Q = f (Price of X, Prices of
Related Goods, Current State of Technology, Input Prices, Weather, and so
on).").
59. See COLANDER, supra note 25, at 272 (defining deadweight loss as "the
net cost to society from the existence of monopoly").
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evolving common-law doctrine, as well as his or her ability to
access, understand, and relate fundamental microeconomic
theory. The integration of economics is essential in the study
and application of antitrust law. Such integration, however,
is often problematic given the breadth and depth of both the
legal and economics fields, as well as their respective
institutional constraints. Although the statutory origins of
U.S. antitrust law include a political component,6 0 antitrust
scholars, academicians, and practitioners tend to orient their
analysis exclusively upon economic theory. While economists
find clarity in their theories and models, the legal profession's
application of such models is often colored with the law's
institutional biases, driven by the value it attaches to stare
decisis.6' Consequently, the clarity of microeconomics is often
compromised, contorted, and even ignored by jurisprudential
economics in an attempt to reconcile economic theory with the
factual precedent of past antitrust decisions.
60. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1223-24 (1988) (concluding "that the language of the
Sherman Act meant something far different to those who approved it than it
does under Bork's [adoption of the Chicago School theory of consumer welfare]
analysis. Congress reacted to a particular problem: pervasive public outrage
over the great trusts, and popular demand for the restoration of a balance of
economic power in American society."). Professor Millon explains:
Congress and the American public viewed the great trusts in light of a
traditional conception of the connection between individual liberty and
economic organization. Liberty was the freedom to pursue one's self-
defined goals to the greatest extent consistent with the liberty of
others. Trusts threatened this liberty in two ways. First, they
possessed the economic power to exclude people from opportunities to
seek material success through competition in the market. Second, the
trusts' immense wealth provided the ability to corrupt the legislative
process so as to benefit their owners at the expense of the rest of
society. Liberty therefore depended on the decentralization of economic
power; the possibility that concentration may have been more efficient
in some circumstances could not justify its evils.
Id. at 1224.
61. Black's Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as "[t]he doctrine of
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
It merits observing that the Supreme Court's compulsion to conclude that the
injury complained of in Cargill did not constitute a threat of an antitrust injury
was driven by its precedent established in Brunswick. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text. And yet, regardless of the factual and legal precedent of
Brunswick, the economist would have reached the same conclusion in Cargill
with the aid of microeconomic theory and its models.
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For example, in the recently decided case Sanderson v.
Culligan International Co.,62 Judge Frank Easterbrook
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs antitrust claims,
holding that neither § 1 nor § 2 of the Sherman Act reached
the defendant's alleged false and disparaging statements
made during a trade show about plaintiffs products. In the
Chicago School tradition,' Judge Easterbrook, citing
precedent, stated:
Antitrust law condemns practices that drive up prices by
curtailing output. False statements about a rival's goods
do not curtail output in either the short run or the long
run. They just set the stage for competition in a different
venue: the advertising market.65
Indeed, microeconomic theory maintains that conduct
that artificially drives up prices or curtails output obstructs
the efficiencies emanating from a competitive market
structure.66  Judge Easterbrook's assertion that "false
statements about a rival's goods" do not create similar
inefficiencies is simply incorrect and illustrates the enervated
nature of jurisprudential economics. As demonstrated above,
microeconomic theory abhors false, misleading, and
incomplete information because it obstructs the operation of
the perfectly competitive model and can result in
inefficiencies characterized by reduced demand, curtailed
output, higher prices, and economic waste. By making such
an absolute statement, Judge Easterbrook compromises and
contorts, if not ignores, requisite core economic principles in
an attempt to reconcile their application with historical,
factual precedent.
62. Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2005).
63. Id. at 622.
64. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 215 (1985) ("The Chicago School model of antitrust policy dictates
that allocative efficiency as defined by the market should be the only goal of the
antitrust laws.").
65. Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
66. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 1, at 347 ("Because monopoly power
results in higher prices and lower quantities produced, we would expect it to
make consumers worse off and the firm better off.").
67. In rendering his opinion, Judge Easterbrook referenced his previous
opinion in Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d. 397
(7th Cir. 1989), involving a supposed commercial falsehood, wherein he
explicitly asserted that "[i]f such statements should be false or misleading or
incomplete or just plain mistaken, the remedy is not antitrust litigation but
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B. Sanderson v. Culligan International Co.-Judge
Easterbrook's Flawed Jurisprudential Economics
Charles Sanderson, an inventor and manufacturer of a
number of magnetic devices used to improve certain water
qualities, filed suit against Indiana Soft Water Services, Inc.
and Culligan International for allegedly publishing and
distributing false information that disparaged his products.6 8
Sanderson asserted claims under both the Lanham Act and
the Sherman Antitrust Act. The trial court dismissed his
antitrust claims and granted summary judgment with respect
to his Lanham Act claims. 69 At the core of his complaint,
Sanderson "allege[d] a widespread conspiracy in the
worldwide market beginning in the 1970s 'to discredit and
malign magnetic water treatments.' 7 ° The Water Quality
Association, a trade association, was alleged to be at the
center of this conspiracy.7' Sanderson specifically alleged
that the Water Quality Association conspired with others to
restrain trade by means including:
Improper use of various studies and reports
derogatory to magnetic water treatment and devices,
... including interstate and international publication
and sale of the studies with knowledge that the
information contained therein was not accurate, and
acting with reckless disregard of the truth or accuracy
of the conclusions reached in the studies.
Distribution of negative position papers and policy
statements regarding magnetic water treatment.
Banning the display of magnetic treatment devices at
the trade shows sponsored by Water Quality
Association.
The instigation of investigations by various public
more speech-the marketplace of ideas." Id. at 400.
68. Sanderson v. Ind. Soft Water Servs., Inc., No. IPOO-0459-CHK, 2004 WL
1784755, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 23, 2004)). It merits noting that after the parties'
pre-trial conference, Sanderson stipulated to the dismissal of all claims against
Indiana Soft Water Services, leaving Culligan International as the only
defendant. Id. at 1 n.1.
69. Id.; see also Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 621-22 (7th
Cir. 2005).
70. Sanderson v. Brugman, No. IPOO-459-C-HIG, 2001 WL 699876, at *1
(S.D. Ind. May 29, 2001).
71. Id.
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officials, including various state attorneys general, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the Better Business
Bureau, with such investigations being prompted by
an improper motive, to-wit, the restraint of trade and
harassment of a competitor.
Placement of letters and other articles of
misinformation in the trade press.
Direct contact with customers and potential customers
of Plaintiff to discredit Plaintiffs products and
processes.
Appearances at trade shows and other public forums
to distribute information negative to magnetic water
treatment.72
Applying conventional microeconomic theory to the facts
in Sanderson, if Culligan and others, namely the Water
Quality Association, disseminated truthful and accurate
information about Sanderson's product, such conduct
accommodates competition. Competitors who disseminate
accurate and truthful information should be applauded for
being exemplar economic citizens. On the other hand, if
Culligan combined with others for the express purpose of
disseminating false and inaccurate information, such conduct
is antithetical to the perfectly competitive model. Such
conduct would be anticompetitive and should be condemned
as such.
Unfortunately, the parties will never know whether such
conduct was nurturing or injurious to the fundamental tenets
of the perfectly competitive model. The district court
dismissed Sanderson's case for failing to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 73  According to the district court,
Sanderson's antitrust claim was built upon allegations that
the defendants and others engaged in a deliberate campaign
to falsely disparage Sanderson's product.74 Constrained by
precedent,75 the district court ruled that "Sanderson's
antitrust claim fails at the pleading stage for failure to
72. Id. (citing Sanderson's First Amended Complaint at 40).
73. Id.
74. Id. at *2.
75. See Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Opthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.
1989).
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identify any conduct that could be actionable as a restraint of
trade."76  In reaching its summary conclusion, the district
court quoted Judge Easterbrook in Schachar v. American
Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.: "Warfare among suppliers
and their different products is competition. Antitrust law
does not compel your competitor to praise your product or
sponsor your work. To require cooperation or friendliness
among rivals is to undercut the intellectual foundations of
antitrust law."" According to the district court, Schachar
made it clear that the antitrust laws are not a source of relief
for Sanderson's claim that the defendants were making
deliberately false or misleading statements about his
products. 7  The district court held that "joint criticism," even
if proven to be false, is not enough to establish an antitrust
violation. 9
C. Judge Easterbrook's Analysis
On appeal, Judge Easterbrook reiterated the ill-conceived
precedential rule of law that the Sherman Act does not reach
conduct consisting of the intentional false disparagement of a
rival's goods.80 According to Easterbrook, "[a]ntitrust law
condemns practices that drive up prices by curtailing output.
False statements about a rival's goods do not curtail output in
76. Brugman, 2001 WL 699876, at *2-3 (citing Schachar, 870 F.2d at 397)
("ITlhe Seventh Circuit explained the governing principles here. In Schachar,
several ophthalmologists sued a professional association and some of its
members alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade by labeling a surgical technique
(radial keratotomy) as 'experimental,' with the effect of depressing demand for
plaintiffs' services in providing the surgery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a
jury verdict in favor of the defendants, but its opinion stated in no uncertain
terms that the case should never have been allowed to go to trial because there
was no evidence of any restraint of trade .... Similarly here, Sanderson has not
alleged that defendants imposed any restraints of trade, such as boycotts or
other coercive measures, that prevented customers or others from dealing with
him or prevented him from selling his products to any willing buyer.").
77. Id. at *3. Accord Schachar, 870 F.2d at 399; Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v.
Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Competition is a
ruthless process. A firm that reduces costs and expands sales injures rivals-
sometimes fatally. The firm that slashes costs the most captures the greatest
sales and inflicts the greatest injury. The deeper the injury to rivals, the
greater the potential benefit. These injuries to rivals are byproducts of vigorous
competition, and the antitrust laws are not balm from rival's wounds. The
antitrust laws are for the benefit of competition, not competitors.")
78. Brugman, 2001 WL 699876, at *3.
79. Id. (interpreting Judge Easterbrook's holding in Schachar).
80. See Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2005).
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either the short or the long run. They just set the stage for
competition in a different venue: the advertising market."
8
Judge Easterbrook is right to suggest that competition is
"warfare," and therefore "criticism," or rather "product
disparagement," alone may constitute a proper and welcomed
method of competitive engagement. Product disparagement,
if true, provides important information to market
participants necessary for competition to thrive. As stated
above, one of the critical assumptions of the perfectly
competitive model is that "[all market participants, that is
all buyers and sellers, are fully informed of all relevant
economic and technological data.""2 Information is sacrosanct
to competition. Access to information on both the demand
and supply side of the equilibrium equation fosters and
nurtures vigorous competition. Without accurate
information, rationality is impaired and economic waste
results.8 3
Judge Easterbrook is wrong, however, to suggest that the
intentional, false disparagement of a rival's products cannot
rise to the level of a Sherman Act violation. While antitrust
law does not compel a competitor to praise a rival's product or
sponsor its work," antitrust law does compel a competitor to
refrain from anticompetitive conduct that either restrains or
attempts to restrain trade, or in fact, may effectuate a
monopoly. The antitrust law is the statutory guardian angel
of the perfectly competitive model. To reiterate, "antitrust
injury" is synonymous with "injury to competition." 5 False
information impairs a fundamental operational condition of
the perfectly competitive model and, therefore, is injurious to
competition. Intentional dissemination of false information
about a rival's product restrains trade in that it restrains
rational action in the marketplace.
Additionally, a conspiracy engaged in the false
disparagement of a rival's product hinders product
substitution. It may not only cause firms to exit the
81. Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
82. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 26, at 290-91; see also supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
83. See discussion supra Part III.B.
84. See Culligan, 415 F.3d at 623 (quoting Schachar v. Am. Acad. of
Opthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989)).
85. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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marketplace irrationally, but may also create barriers to
entry and re-entry. To the extent that such intentional
conduct forces suppliers to leave the marketplace, economic
theory demonstrates that the supply function is apt to shift to
the left, thereby curtailing output and increasing price. 6
Moreover, the antitrust implications of such conduct are
accentuated in an already concentrated market, or a
dominant firm market. When such conduct forces
marketplace exit, it nurtures an environment susceptible to
single-firm market power with respect to output and price.
D. Intentional False Disparagement Is Per Se Unreasonable
Information is an essential and necessary condition of the
perfectly competitive market. Conduct that intentionally
skews, taints, twists, distorts, biases, or contorts information
should perhaps be relegated per se unlawful under the
Sherman Act. After all, the Supreme Court has held price-
fixing to be per se unlawful, regardless of whether the price
ultimately fixed might be reasonable." As Justice Douglas
observed in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. :88
[F]or over forty years [the Supreme Court) has
consistently and without deviation adhered to the
principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se
under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called
86. See supra fig.3.
87. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927)
("The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the
elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether
reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix
arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may
through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of
tomorrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the
absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when
fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of
minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as
fixed and without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the
burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable
though the mere variation of economic conditions. Moreover, in the absence of
express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construction
making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of business
relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable-a
determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of
our economic organization and a choice between rival philosophies.").
88. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were
designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a
defense.8 9
As with price fixing, combinations, agreements, or
conspiracies to engage in the intentional, false disparagement
of a rival firm's products or services "may or may not be
aimed at complete elimination of ... competition,"90 however,
"[whatever economic justification [such] particular
agreements may be thought to have, the law [should] not
permit an inquiry into [its] reasonableness."9' Given the
fundamental importance of truthful and accurate information
in the marketplace, such agreements should "all be banned
because of their actual threat to the central nervous system of
the economy."9 2
Judge Easterbrook's analysis in Sanderson v. Culligan
International Co. exemplifies what this article refers to as
jurisprudential economics. Constrained by precedent largely
established himself, Judge Easterbrook's analysis contorts
and twists fundamental microeconomic principles to find a
result consistent with that precedent. Although he might be
correct to state that "[tihere can be no restraint of trade
without a restraint,"9 3 he is short-sighted to conclude that the
intentional dissemination of false information about a rival's
product does not constitute a restraint of trade. Such conduct
restrains the autonomous forces of supply and demand, and is
therefore injurious to competition. Similarly, it restrains
rational action necessary for efficient trade and is therefore a
restraint of trade.
V. CONCLUSION
Product disparagement, depending on its motivating
origins, can either nurture or spoil a competitive
environment. Disparagement motivated by a rivalry
grounded in truthful, accurate information is welcome
competitive conduct and should be encouraged as a matter of
public policy. To the extent such disparagement reveals
89. Id. at 218.
90. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 (1990)
(citing Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-26 n.59).
91. Id. (citing Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-26 n.59).
92. Id. (citing Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-26 n.59).
93. Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2005).
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accurate distinctions with respect to product characteristics
and qualities, it cultivates a vigorous, competitive
environment. However, product disparagement fueled by a
rivalry driven by deception and misinformation is
unacceptable and should be discouraged as a matter of public
policy. The dissemination of false, deceptive, and inaccurate
information desecrates the hallowed efficiencies for which
competition is so highly touted. Contrary to the flawed
jurisprudential economics applied by Judge Easterbrook in
Sanderson v. Culligan International Co., microeconomics
instructs that fully informed market participants are a
required condition of the perfectly competitive model. If the
antitrust laws are intended to protect competition from
conduct that is ultimately injurious to its operational
foundation, then such laws are relevant and applicable in
situations involving the intentional false disparagement of a
rival's products. Intentional false disparagement of a rival's
product is an unacceptable form of economic warfare, and
Judge Easterbrook is amiss to suggest otherwise. Such
conduct imperils the operational efficiencies of perfect
competition and is proscribed as a matter of microeconomic
theory. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's summary
conclusion that §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act fail to reach
such conduct is economically ill-conceived. It defies
conventionally accepted economic constructs and, most
importantly, it essentially legislates a statutory exception
with respect to conduct that threatens the very heart of the
perfectly competitive model.
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